We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference pro…les. We show that if the rule satis…es in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be de…ned. We also provide a converse of this main …nding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof rules are admissible are semilattice single-peaked domains.
Introduction
Strategy-proofness plays a central role in mechanism design. A social choice function is strategy-proof if, for every preference pro…le, truthtelling is a dominant strategy in its induced game form. Hence, the potentially complex strategic decision problems of agents involved in a strategy-proof social choice function are extremely simple indeed, for whether or not an agent's strategy is dominant depends only on the preferences of the agent and not on the other agents' preferences. Under strategy-proofness the interlinked decisions become a collection of independent optimization problems. Thus, the use of a strategyproof social choice function does not require (as any other solution concept related to Nash equilibrium would) any informational hypothesis about the beliefs that each agent holds about the other agents'preferences, and the subsequent iteration of beliefs until the preference pro…le becomes common knowledge. However, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that requiring truthful reporting of preferences in weakly dominant strategies implies dictatorship whenever preferences of agents are unrestricted. This fundamental result has directed subsequent research on social choice in the presence of private information towards suitably restricted domains of preferences which permit the design of anonymous, and hence non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice functions. Particularly prominent in this regard is the class of single-peaked preferences and its variants and the strategy-proof social choice functions characterized for such domains are extensions of the median voter scheme. 2 Single-peaked preferences are well known to have desirable properties in the context of aggregation theory. They also provide the underpinnings of many models in political and public economics. 3 Single-peaked preferences have been speci…ed by postulating an underlying structure on the set of alternatives that allows one to state for every triple x; y and z of alternatives, that y is between x and z; and so on, and the restriction imposed by single-peakedness is that if
x is top-ranked for a particular preference ordering, then y; by virtue of being in between
x and z; be ranked at least as high as z: This paper formulates a more general concept of single-peakedness in terms of a partial order on the set of alternatives with the property that every pair of alternatives possesses a supremum under the postulated partial order. 4 Our concept of single-peakedness requires that for any triple x; y and z of alternatives, a 2 Single-peakedness was initially proposed by Black (1948) and Inada (1964) . The surveys of Barberà (2001 Barberà ( , 2010 and Sprumont (1995) contain several axiomatic characterizations of the median voter scheme and its extensions. 3 See Austen-Smith and Banks (1999 Banks ( , 2005 .
preference ordering that has x as its top-ranked alternative should rank the supremum of the pair (x; y) at least as high as the supremum of the pair (z; y).
5
Our main …nding is that this concept of single-peakedness is implied by the existence of a strategy-proof and anonymous social choice function which is determined completely by the pro…le of the agents top-ranked alternatives (i.e., is tops-only), and satis…es additionally the innocuous requirement of unanimity, whenever such a social choice function can be de…ned for an even number of agents and the underlying domain satis…es a richness requirement. 6 Our approach reconstructs the partial order on alternatives in a natural way from the social choice function with the four stated properties. Observe that the partial order depends on the particular social choice function under consideration and hence, the derived concept of single-peakedness may di¤er across di¤erent social choice functions. Our methodology applies to domains that allow the design of well-behaved social choice functions for any even number of voters. While this restriction to an even number of voters is somewhat awkward, we do not necessarily view it as a drawback of our approach, given that our intention is to reconstruct features of a domain of preferences that allows the design of well-behaved social choice functions for all societies; indeed while our methodology would not identify a domain that allows well-behaved social choice functions to be designed only for societies with an odd number of agents, one might argue that such a domain would be too speci…c. The semilattice single-peaked condition identi…ed by our methodology su¢ ces for the design of well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions for all, in particular odd, numbers of agents.
Fix a tops-only and unanimous social choice function. Assume the number of agents is two and let x and y be two alternatives. We say that x y if and only if x is chosen at any pro…le of preferences where one agent has x as the top-ranked alternative and the other y. The assumed axioms of unanimity and anonymity imply that is re ‡exive and antisymmetric respectively. Our requirement that the domain of preferences be rich ensures that is transitive and that the social choice function must be of a particular form: at any pro…le of preferences, the social choice is the supremum of the pair of alternatives that are top-ranked by the two agents. Our de…nition of single-peakedness now obtains as a direct consequence of strategy-proofness. This methodology applies whenever the number of agents is even. A similar …nding holds under an additional axiom of invariance when a social choice function with the aforementioned properties can be de…ned only for an 5 Later in the paper we explain this property and discuss why it may be seen as a weakening of singlepeakedness. 6 Most well-known social choice functions identi…ed in the restricted domain literature generate binary relations that allow interesting preference domains to satisfy our richness requirement. odd number of agents. As a converse to our main …nding, we show that any domain of preferences (there is no richness requirement) which is semilattice single-peaked with respect to a partial order possessing the supremum property admits a strategy-proof, anonymous, and unanimous social choice function that is completely determined by the pro…le of the agents top-ranked alternatives, for any number of agents.
In the literature on social choice on restricted domains, there has been interest in formulating a sort of converse to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; a statement that would identify features of a domain that are implied by the design of a unanimous, strategy-proof social choice function that is "non-dictatorial". It has been conjectured that domain restrictions of the single-peaked variety and social choice functions of the median voter scheme form are salient in this regard. 7 We formalize a non-dictatorial social choice function using the axiom of anonymity and require additionally that the social choice function satisfy the tops-only property. For the complete domain, strategy-proofness and unanimity imply the tops-only property. Given that we work in a restricted domain setting with no structure on the set of alternatives, it does not appear feasible to derive the tops-only property as a consequence of strategy-proofness and unanimity; we accordingly impose it as an axiom.
Our methods lead to a simple and fairly general version of a statement to the e¤ect that a particular form of single-peakedness is implied by strategy-proofness in conjunction with anonymity and other natural axioms and that this form of single-peakedness su¢ ces for the design of social choice functions with these properties. In particular, the semilattice structure on alternatives arises endogenously as it is implied by the axioms on the social choice function and a richness condition relative to the social choice function, and does not rely on any a priori structure on the set of alternatives or preferences (apart from the requirement that each preference has a unique top-ranked alternative).
Related literature
An early formulation of a partial converse statement to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is Bogomolnaia (1998) . In a model with …nitely many alternatives and two agents, she identi…es the features of any anonymous and tops-only social choice function under which the …nite set of alternatives can be embedded into a …nite dimensional Euclidean space with a grid structure with the property that the social choice function takes the form of a (multi-dimensional) median voter scheme. This embedding depends crucially on the set of alternatives being …nite. These features of tops-only and anonymous social choice 7 Conjectures of this nature have been attributed by Barberà (2010) to Faruk Gul and referred to as Gul's conjecture.
functions are stated in terms of the same binary relation induced by a two agent tops-only and anonymous social choice function that we use in our paper, and are the following:
(i) the binary relation is transitive and a semilattice and (ii) the social choice function is the supremum of the pair of alternatives that are the top-ranked alternatives of the two agents. These …ndings are extended to the three agent case under similar, but somewhat more demanding, hypotheses and she derives additionally that the domain of preferences must be multi-dimensional single-peaked on the set of alternatives. Our work extends this methodology in the following sense. We postulate a richness condition on the domain in terms of the binary relation on alternatives induced by a two agent social choice function satisfying our axioms and derive that the binary relation is transitive and that the social choice function has the supremum property. This is used to establish the salience of the supremum rule and a version of single-peaked preferences in a general setting with an arbitrary number of agents without requiring the set of alternatives to be …nite. In particular, under our richness condition, the set of alternatives need not turn out to be embedded in a …nite dimensional Euclidean space with a grid structure as in Bogomolnaia (1998) , but the identi…cation of the social choice function as a supremum rule on our version of a single-peaked domain remains valid. Sanver and Sen (2013), provide formulations of such a converse statement. Our paper complements these approaches and is closely related to the approach of these papers in that our axioms on the social choice function are similar. However, there are important di¤erences in the scope of our model and our methodology. The richness condition in these papers is speci…ed independently of the social choice function whose existence is postulated whereas in our paper the richness condition is speci…ed in relation to the social choice function. But more importantly, the methodology in these papers strongly relies also on the …niteness of the set of alternatives and on strict preferences. The approach of Puppe (2007a, 2007b and 2010) assumes a speci…c structure on the …nite set of alternatives by means of a given property space from which a betweenness relation can be derived. Again, their approach assumes that the set of alternatives is …nite and it is endowed with an a priori structure, the property space. The richness condition in Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013) is speci…ed in terms of alternatives that appear as the …rst and second ranked alternatives in di¤erent preference orderings which makes it speci…c 8 Observe that neither Bogomolnaia (1998) nor we pretend to characterize a subclass of strategy-proof social choice functions on a given restricted domain of preferences. Rather, the objective is to identify the key property of any domain that admits a well-behaved and strategy-proof social choice function.
to a model with …nitely many alternatives with strict preferences and also excludes the consideration of preferences commonly employed in the study of multidimensional models.
Our formulation is more permissive in that we impose no …niteness requirement on the set of alternatives and, provided the top-ranked alternative is unique, we admit indi¤erences.
As a consequence, our methodology is of necessity di¤erent and somewhat more direct than that of those papers. Many prominent restricted domains of preferences studied in the literature appear as special cases of our formulation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces basic de…nitions and notation while Section 3 contains the main results for the case of an even number of agents. In Section 4 we relate our results to the large literature on domain restrictions for non-trivial strategy-proof social choice functions. Section 5 elaborates on our methodology and axioms and gathers some …nal remarks. An appendix contains an analysis of the case of an odd number of agents, the proofs of two results omitted in the main text, and the case of a …nite set of alternatives.
Basic de…nitions and notation
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be the …nite set of agents, with n 2, and A be any set of alternatives.
We do not assume any a priori structure on the set of alternatives. Each agent i 2 N has a preference (relation) R i 2 D over A, where D is a subset of complete, re ‡exive and transitive binary relations on A: 9 The set D is referred to as the domain of preferences.
For any x; y 2 A; xR i y means that agent i considers alternative x to be at least as good as alternative y: Let P i and I i denote the strict and indi¤erence relations induced by R i over A, respectively; namely, for any x; y 2 A; xP i y if and only if xR i y and :yR i x; and xI i y if and only if xR i y and yR i x. We assume that for each R i 2 D there exists t(R i ) 2 A, the top
Moreover, we assume that for each x 2 A the domain D contains at least one preference R x i : A pro…le R = (R 1 ; : : : ; R n ) 2 D n is an n tuple of preferences, one for each agent. To emphasize the role of agent i we will often write the pro…le R as (R i ; R i ).
A social choice function (SCF) is a mapping f : D n ! A that assigns to every pro…le
. Hence, a tops-only SCF f : D n ! A can be written as f : A n ! A: 9 A binary relation over A is complete if for all x; y 2 A either x y or y x, it is re ‡exive if for all Accordingly, we will on occasion use the notation f (t(R 1 ); : : : ; t(R n )) interchangeably with f (R 1 ; : : : ; R n ):
To de…ne an anonymous SCF on D n ; for every pro…le R 2 D n and every one-to-one mapping : N ! N , de…ne the pro…le R = (R (1) ; : : : ; R (n) ) as the permutation of R, where for all i 2 N , R (i) is the preference that agent (i) had in the pro…le R. Observe that the domain D n is closed under permutations, since it is the Cartesian product of the same set D. An SCF f : D n ! A is anonymous if for all one-to-one mappings :
An SCF f is strategy-proof if for every agent at every preference pro…le R truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy in the direct revelation game induced by f at R:
In this paper, in addition to strategy-proofness, we will require the SCF to satisfy anonymity. This is a key assumption in our analysis and is in some ways an opposite of dictatorship as the identity of no particular agent matters in determining the social outcome. The appeal of this axiom is obvious. In addition we will impose that the SCF also satisfy the tops-only requirement. This axiom simpli…es considerably the speci…cation of the SCF, as well as the act of reporting preferences and checking that there are no gainful manipulations, and is pervasive in the literature on the characterization of strategy-proof SCFs on restricted domains. This axiom has some normative appeal and it is of interest to study what sort of preference domains permit the design of a strategy-proof SCF that is also tops-only. We discuss the role of this axiom further in Section 5. The axiom of unanimity is natural to impose and is mild as it follows as a consequence of strategy-proofness whenever the SCF is required to be onto the set of alternatives.
Results

Obtaining the induced binary relation
In this subsection we assume that n = 2 and indicate how to obtain a binary relation from a tops-only SCF f : D 2 ! A and show that if the SCF satis…es in addition unanimity and anonymity, then is re ‡exive and antisymmetric. 10 In doing so, we follow a procedure introduced by Bogomolnaia (1998) . 
An SCF aggregates individual preferences and can be seen as a systematic procedure specifying how a society resolves its members'disagreements. Hence, the binary relation induced by an SCF f over A may be interpreted as the outcome of this procedure applied to the family of basic situations in which there are only two agents; the relation x y re ‡ects the fact that in this scenario the alternative x prevails over y: 11 We will show later that if the SCF f is strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous, then its induced binary relation is transitive, provided the domain of f satis…es a richness condition. Here we note that the following result is immediate. 
where R 2 D n is such that R j = R 1 for all j 2 N 1 and R j = R 2 for all j 2 N 2 , is strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous. Moreover, if g is unanimous, then so is f:
In view of Fact 1, we say that a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous
where n is a positive even integer, induces a binary relation over A,
where it is understood that is the binary relation induced by f over A where f is induced from g by "cloning"the …rst n 2 agents as agent 1 and the remaining as agent 2.
11 Since the binary relation is not required to be complete, it may be the case that neither alternative prevails over the other and f (x; y) is a third alternative z:
An illustration of the main result
We use the prominent instance of a median voter rule de…ned on a domain of single-peaked preferences (originally proposed by Black (1948) and studied by Moulin (1980) 
A characterization result in Moulin (1980) implies that any strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF f : SP 2 ! A is a median voter rule.
So assume the SCF f : SP 2 ! A is a median voter rule and let be its associated …xed ballot. Since a median voter rule depends only on the top ranked alternatives of the agents' preferences, it will be convenient to write f (R 1 ; R 2 ) as f (x; y) where x = t(R 1 ), and y = t(R 2 ). We now apply condition (1) to f to generate a binary relation on A by saying that for all x; y 2 A, x y if and only if f (x; y) = x: Since f (x; x) = x (the median voter rule is unanimous), is re ‡exive and since f (x; y) = f (y; x) for all x; y, is also antisymmetric. It is however not complete since if x and y lie on opposite sides of , f (x; y) = and so x y and y x. Furthermore, the domain of single-peaked preferences satis…es our richness condition (this is formally de…ned in Subsection 3.3), and this will imply that is transitive. As a consequence, is a partial order and (we will prove that in general) for every pair x; y 2 A; sup (x; y) exists and is given by f (x; y), so that is a semilattice. Hence f (x; y) = med > (x; y; ) = sup (x; y): Figure 1 Figure 1 12 Given a list of K real numbers (x 1 ; : : : ; x K ), where K is a positive odd integer, de…ne med > (x 1 ; : : : ; x K ) = y, where y 2 R is such that #ft 2 f1; : : : ; Kg j x t yg = #ft 2 f1; : : : ; Kg j
Our main result will show that for the strategy-proofness of the median voter rule f , one does not actually need the domain of preferences to be single-peaked; it may be larger. To see this, suppose agent two has the top ranked alternative y and agent one's true preference puts x on top. Strategy-proofness requires that f (x; y)R x i f (z; y) for all z 2 A, which is equivalent to the requirement that sup (x; y)R x i sup (z; y). This last condition is our concept of semilattice single-peakedness. Figure 2 illustrates a semilattice single-peaked preference R i on (A; ) when sup A = . Observe four features of R i .
First, R i is far from being single-peaked on A. Second, R i is monotonically (not necessarily strictly) decreasing on the segment [t(R i ); ]; and hence single-peaked on it, for should there exist y; z 2 (t(R i ); ) such that y < z and zP i y; then f (z; y) = zP i y = f (t(R i ); y), a manipulation. Third, no condition is imposed between pairs on [0; t(R i )): Fourth, R i x for each alternative x 2 ( ; 1] and no condition is imposed between pairs of alternatives on this segment. The reason underlying the last two conditions is that if t(R i ) < ; then
and hence how R i orders pairs of alternatives that are either below t(R i ) or above is irrelevant for the manipulability of f:
We establish the following general version of the con…guration presented above: If a preference domain admits a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF for an even number of agents, then the preferences must be semilattice single-peaked. We also establish that given a semilattice single-peaked domain of preferences, we can de…ne a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF for any number of voters.
Rich domains and semilattice single-peaked preferences
We now turn to a description of the domain of preferences that we characterize in this Richness says that for any pair of distinct alternatives x and y related by and any alternative z not lying between x and y; a rich domain has to contain two preference relations with the properties that for one of the preferences x is the top-ranked alternative and y is strictly preferred to z; and for the other preference y is the top-ranked alternative and x is strictly preferred to z. Our concept of a rich domain is relative to the binary relation induced by the SCF that is applied to it. Thus, whether or not a domain D is rich depends on the particular SCF f : D 2 ! A operating on it. Below we will illustrate the concept of rich domain by means of an example.
We now exhibit conditions under which is transitive.
that induces over A and is strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous, then is transitive.
Proof : Assume the three distinct alternatives x; y; z 2 A are such that x y and y z.
We show that x z; namely, f (x; z) = x. First, suppose f (x; z) = w = 2 fx; yg: By strategyproofness, f (x; w) = w: Hence, w x y and w = 2 [y; x] 6 = ;: Since D is rich on (A; ),
a contradiction with strategy-proofness of f: Thus, f (x; z) 2 fx; yg: Assume f (x; z) = y:
But then, by strategy-proofness, f (x; y) = y; a contradiction with x y: Hence f (x; z) = x and x z. Thus, is transitive.
A partial order over A is a re ‡exive, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation over A: A partial order over A is a (join-)semilattice if for all (x; y) 2 A A; sup (x; y) exists. 13 In Lemma 2 below we will establish that the binary relation induced by f on A is a (join-)semilattice, provided that f is strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous and D is rich on (A; ): We now turn to our concept of a single-peaked preference in this setting.
Definition 2 Let be a semilattice over A. The preference R We say that a domain D is semilattice single-peaked on (A; ) if it is a subset of all semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A; ).
Single-peaked preferences embodies the idea that an alternative y that is "closer" to the top x of a preference ordering R x i than is an alternative z, should be ranked at least as high as z: We now argue that semilattice single-peakedness embodies in some measure this idea in its treatment of those pairs of alternatives that arise as suprema under the semilattice : Given a triple of alternatives x; y; z, we say that y is "closer" to x than is z according to the semilattice ; if x y holds and x z y (equivalently, z 2 [x; y])
does not hold: Now consider any preference R x i 2 D and consider any pair of alternatives y; z. Assume …rst that sup (z; y) x: Then we have x sup (x; y) sup (z; y) holds, so that sup (x; y) is closer to the top x of R x i than is sup (z; y): Even when the condition sup (z; y)
x does not hold, we have at any rate that sup (z; y) = 2 [x; sup (x; y)] and here too sup (x; y) is closer to the top x of R x i than is sup (z; y): Indeed the condition of semilattice single-peakedness requires that in this situation, sup (x; y) being closer to the top x; should be ranked by R x i at least as high as sup (z; y). To better understand the concepts of richness and semilattice single-peakedness on (A; ), it is convenient to look at the semilattice (A; ) as a partially directed graph.
To make the argument more transparent assume A is …nite and that sup A exists and is denoted by : Figure 3 represents an example of such a semilattice (A; ) as a partially directed graph, where A = fx; y; z; ; x 1 ; : : : ; x 13 g and the direction of an arrow on the edge linking two alternatives indicates how they are related according to the partial order ; for example, x ! y means that y x (arrows that can be obtained from the transitivity of are omitted).
13 Given x; y 2 A; sup (x; y) = z if and only if z is the least element in A that is greater than or equal (according to ) to x and y; namely z 2 fw 2 A j w x and w yg and, for all z 0 2 fw 2 A j w x and w yg; z 0 z: Since is antisymmetric, if the supremum exists it is unique. y for all y 6 = x). The …rst of these applies to alternatives that appear along any path emanating from x. There are two such paths from x to (emphasized with bold type links); namely, x y x 3 z and x x 2 x 4 z : Along such paths, we have classical single-peakedness. Thus, since the pair y; z belong to the …rst path, we have yR x i z. Observe that sup (x; y) = y and sup (z; y) = z: However, note that since the alternatives x 3 and x 4 belong to di¤erent paths, there is no restriction on the relative ranking of these two alternatives in R x i ; indeed if one were to apply De…nition 2 with x 3 ; x 4 playing the role of y; z respectively, one only obtains sup (x;
The second restriction applies to alternatives that are not in a path from x to :
Such alternatives are dispreferred to the "closest" alternative in the path; namely, if w and r are such that x w , r = 2 [x; ]; and sup (x; r) = w, then wR x i r (observe that sup (r; r) = r). For instance in Figure 3 , yR x i x 5 and yR x i x 1 but no condition is imposed on the preference between x 5 and x 1 ; moreover, take any z 0 ; z 00 2 fx 10 ; x 11 ; x 12 g such that z 0 6 = z 00 and observe that sup (x; z 0 ) = z, sup (z 00 ; z 0 ) = x 12 and sup (z 0 ; z 0 ) = z 0 : Then,
Finally, we enumerate below the restrictions implied on a preference R x i over A: By de…nition, we know that xP 
., x k plays simultaneously the role of y and z in De…nition 2).
x i x 6 = sup (x 6 ; x 6 ) (i.e., x 6 plays simultaneously the role of y and z in De…nition 2). 13 plays simultaneously the role of y and z in De…nition 2).
Observe that semilattice single-peakedness leaves freedom to R x i on how it orders many pairs of alternatives. For instance, we have already noted that the relative ranking of the pair x 3 ; x 4 is not …xed. Consider next the path x 7 ! x 9 ! x: Here too, letting x 7 ; x 9 play the role of y; z in De…nition 2 does not lead to any restriction on the relative rankings of x 7 and x 9 in R x i since sup (x; x 9 ) = xR x i x 9 = sup (x 7 ; x 9 ): Proposition 1 below shows that the two restrictions used in the example characterize indeed semilattice single-peakedness. After stating the main result of the paper in Proposition 3 we will be in a better position to comment on why semilattice single-peakedness emerges as an implication of strategy-proofness (and other desirable properties) and can be seen as a weakening of the classical concept of single-peakedness.
Proposition 1 Let be a semilattice over A: Then, the preference R x i is semilattice single-peaked on (A; ) if and only if the following two properties hold:
(i) for all y; z 2 A such that x y z, yR 
holds by distinguishing among three cases.
Case 1: sup (x; y) = x: Then (2) holds trivially since x = t(R 
Semilattice single-peaked domains admit an SCF with the desirable properties
Before presenting the main result of the paper in Proposition 3 below, we show that a semilattice single-peaked domain admits a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF for an arbitrary number of agents. This generalizes in a very simple way the converse of the main result in Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013) to settings where A is not necessarily …nite and the underlying structure is not necessarily a tree.
Proposition 2 Let D be a semilattice single-peaked domain on the semilattice (A; ).
Then, there exists a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF f : D n ! A for all n: Moreover, if n is even then is induced by f over A.
Proof : We …rst establish the following induction step: Suppose for k 2; sup (x 1 ; : : : ; x k )
exists for every set fx 1 ; : : : ; x k g of k distinct alternatives. Then for any alternative x k+1 = 2 fx 1 ; : : : ; x k g, sup (x 1 ; : : : ; x k+1 ) exists and is given by sup sup (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ); x k+1 .
To verify this step, let y = sup (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ). By the induction hypothesis, sup (y; x k+1 ) exists and is denoted w. Since is transitive, w is an upper bound for (x 1 ; : : : ; x k+1 ).
Suppose there exists v 2 Anfwg such that v is an upper bound for (x 1 ; : : : ; x k+1 ). Then it must be that v y since y = sup (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ). We also have v x k+1 : These imply that v is an upper bound for (y; x k+1 ): But since sup (y; x k+1 ) exists and is w; we must have v w and so w = sup (x 1 ; : : : ; x k+1 ):
Given a preference pro…le R 2 D n , let G(R) = fx 1 ; : : : ; x k g; k n; be the set of distinct alternatives such that for each r = 1; : : : ; k; x r = t(R i ) for some i 2 N .
For every R 2 D n ; de…ne
Since is a semilattice, the induction step veri…ed earlier implies that f is well-de…ned.
By construction, f is tops-only, anonymous and unanimous. We next show that f is strategy-proof. Given R 2 D n and i 2 N; let G(R i ) = G(R)nft(R i )g and observe that
To show that f is strategy-proof, we wish to show
By the de…nition of f in (3) and the de…nition of semilattice single-peakedness, (4) holds.
It is straightforward to verify that when n is a even positive integer, is induced by f as de…ned following Fact 1.
Results for the case of n even
We now proceed by …rst showing that any strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous SCF f : D 2 ! A can be seen as the supremum of the binary relation induced by f over A, provided that the domain of f is rich on (A; ): Proof : Let x; y 2 A and assume …rst that x 6 = y. If f (x; y) = x; then x y: By strategyproofness, f (x; x) = x and hence, x x: Thus, x = sup (x; y): Similarly if f (x; y) = y:
Assume f (x; y) = z = 2 fx; yg: By strategy-proofness, f (z; y) = f (x; z) = z: Hence, z x and z y: Thus, z is an upper bound of (x; y): Assume z 6 = sup (x; y); namely, there exists z 2 A, z 6 = z, such that z x and z y and either z z; or z is not comparable to z:
In either case we have z z and hence, z = 2 [x; z] 6 = ;: Furthermore we have f ( z; y) = z.
Since D is rich on (A; ), there exists R We want to show that sup (x;
a contradiction with strategy-proofness of f:
Lemmata 1 and 2 do not require that the SCF should be unanimous. If the SCF f in Lemmata 1 and 2 is unanimous then the binary relation induced by f over A is re ‡exive.
Similarly, if the SCF g in Fact 1 is unanimous, then so is f: From now on we will be interested only in unanimous SCFs.
Recall that (in view of Fact 1) when we say that a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF g : D n ! A; where n is a positive even integer, induces a binary relation over A, it is understood that is the binary relation induced by f over A where f is induced from g by "cloning" the …rst Proof : The proofs of (i) and (ii) follow from Lemmata 1 and 2 respectively. To show that the condition speci…ed in De…nition 2 holds, observe that by Lemma 2 and strategyproofness, f (x; y) = sup (x; y)R 
Related literature
In this section we relate our results to the large literature on restricted domains. The starting point of this approach is to assume that the set of alternatives A has a particular structure (for instance, A is a linearly ordered set). Using this structure one can de…ne a meaningful domain restriction on preferences over A (for instance, single-peakedness) under which non-trivial strategy-proof SCFs can be de…ned (for instance, the median voter rule).
Our Proposition 2 (and its proof) follows partially this approach. We start by hypothesizing that the set A; together with the binary relation ; is a semilattice from which we de…ne the domain D of semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A; ): We then show that there exists a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF f on the domain D which, when n is a positive even integer, is such that is induced by f over A: We want to emphasize however that our main contribution is Proposition 3, which follows a very di¤erent approach. Without assuming any structure on the set of alternatives A, we suppose that there is a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF g on a given domain D of preferences over A. Following Bogomolnaia (1998) we show how to identify using condition (1) a binary relation over A: Then, provided that the domain D is rich on (A; ); we prove that (A; ) is a semilattice, the domain D is semilattice single-peaked on (A; ) and g can be obtained as the supremum rule of a two-agent SCF 16 See for instance Barberà f induced from g: Hence, the semilattice structure on A follows from the existence of an SCF satisfying the desirable properties without imposing any condition on A whatsoever.
We now relate with more detail our results to some representative results of the restricted domains literature. In particular, we consider well studied SCFs in this literature and uncover the associated semilattice that is implicit in each formulation.
Single-peaked preferences on a line
We return to the median voter rule f : (b) The binary relation induced from f using (1) is as follows: if either y < x or x < y then x y and if x > > y then x y and y x:
(c) The domain of single-peaked preferences SP is rich on (A; ) and is a strict subset of the set of all semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A; ), already represented in Figure   2 .
(d) For all x; y 2 A; f (x; y) = sup (x; y) = med > fx; y; g:
Moreover, the following fact can be veri…ed.
(e) The domain of single-peaked preferences coincides with the intersection of all semilattice single-peaked preferences, where each of these sets is associated to each of all possible values in A. In other words, the set of single-peaked preferences is the largest preference domain that is semilattice single-peaked relative to all binary relations induced by all median voter rules (i.e., all strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCFs).
Semi-single-peaked preferences
In the previous subsection the set of alternatives was assumed to be linearly ordered and single-peakedness of preferences and the median was de…ned with respect to this linear order. We now turn to a more general formulation where the alternatives are arranged on a tree. In this case, one may move away from the top of a preference in more than two directions. Single-peakedness on a tree, introduced by Demange (1983) and studied further by Danilov (1994) , 17 requires preferences to be monotonically non-increasing along such 17 which is an implication of strategy-proofness and the other properties, and su¢ ces for the design of such SCFs. The speci…cation of semi-single-peakedness requires the selection of a particular alternative on the tree, called the threshold, whose projection on each path on the tree corresponds to a …xed ballot on that path and the preference restriction of semisingle-peakedness on each path coincides with the one depicted in Figure 2 . We proceed by …rst summarizing their …ndings and by showing that their formulation is a special case of semilattice single-peakedness.
Assume that the set of alternatives A is a …nite tree; i.e., for every pair of alternatives (nodes) x; y 2 A, there is a unique path p linking them, denoted hx; yi. Two alternatives x; y are directly linked if hx; yi = fx; yg: 18 Given alternatives x; y; z 2 A, let (z; hx; yi)
denote the projection of z on the path hx; yi which is de…ned as the unique alternative w 2 A such that hx; zi \ hy; zi = hw; zi. A path p is "maximal"if it cannot be extended by adding more edges at either one of the two ends. Fix a particular alternative on the tree A (call it the threshold), and use it to specify a threshold on every maximal path p, denoted (p), as (p) = ( ; p). Thus, for every maximal path p, if it contains the alternative , set (p) = ; otherwise, the threshold (p) is the unique alternative that lies on every path from an alternative on the path p to alternative . 19 Given A with a tree structure and the threshold 2 A; Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013) say that a preference R i is semi-single-peaked with respect to the threshold if for all x; y 2 A:
(i) x; y 2 p such that x; y 2 ht(R i ); (p)i and x 2 ht(R i ); yi ) [xR i y], and
Moreover, they de…ne the two-agent SCF f , where for all x; y 2 A, f (x; y) = ( ; hx; yi):
They show that the SCF f de…ned by (5) is strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and of alternatives is possibly in…nite and arranged as a graph. They consider separately the case where the graph is a tree and the case where the graph has cycles. They characterize strategy-proof and onto SCFs assuming preferences are Euclidean, which satisfy our richness condition. 18 See Example 3 in Subsection 5.3 for a description of how to, given a domain of preferences, directly link two alternatives. 19 The threshold seeks to identify an alternative on the path p that is "closest" to . In the absence of a distance, the closest alternative is one that belongs to every path emanating from any alternative on p to : On a tree, such an alternative is uniquely identi…ed.
unanimous on the domain of semi-single-peaked preferences on the tree A with respect to the threshold .
The following facts can be veri…ed. 
Multidimensional models
In many social choice problems alternatives are multidimensional. To describe an alternative one has to specify the level reached in each of its attributes. Our setting includes also these cases. Border and Jordan (1983) and Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti (1993) are prototypical examples of this approach, and they can be seen as extensions of Moulin (1980) .
We …rst relate our results with the main ones contained in these two papers and second, with the results in Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) on voting by quota, the case when each attribute can take only two possible values.
Multidimensional single-peaked preferences
We begin by postulating a multidimensional structure on the set of alternatives A, and specifying a restricted domain. A preference with top x is multidimensional single-peaked on A if an alternative z that lies on the shortest path from x to y is weakly preferred to y: General results in Border and Jordan (1983) and Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti (1993) imply that strategy-proof SCFs satisfying our properties are component-wise median voter rules. We …rst provide the details of this formulation and then identify it as an special instance of semilattice single-peakedness.
Assume the set of alternatives A is a Cartesian product of subsets of real numbers; i.e.,
where, for each k = 1; : : : ; K; A k R can be …nite or in…nite. 20 De…ne the L 1 norm in A as follows: for every x 2 A, 
Consider a tops-only SCF f : MSP 2 ! A and let be the semilattice obtained from f using (1). Furthermore, assume f is strategy-proof, anonymous and unanimous, and let 2 A be its associated vector of …xed ballots. The following facts can be veri…ed. where given a …nite set of objects K = f1; : : : ; Kg agents have to choose a subset (possibly empty) of K. It can be described as follows. The set of alternatives is the family 2 K of all subsets of K which can be identi…ed with the K dimensional hypercube f0; 1g K : Namely, any set X 2 2 K can be described as the vector x 2 f0; 1g K where, for each k = 1; : : : ; K;
x k = 1 if and only if k 2 X: Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) identi…es the domain of separable preferences and characterizes the class of strategy-proof SCFs with our properties as voting by quota. Separable preferences allow agents to evaluate objects as "good" or "bad". A voting by quota speci…es an integer number for each object such that the object is included in the chosen subset if and only if the number of agents who declared it as being good is at least as large as this number. We proceed by specifying the details of this set up and brie ‡y indicating the semilattice structure associated with it.
A (strict) preference R i on A is said to be separable if adding an object to a given set makes the new set better if and only if the added object is good (as a singleton set, the object is preferred to the empty set). In the hypercube representation of 2 K ; separability of R i implies the following feature. Let x be the vector of zeros and ones representing the best subset of objects according to R i ; and take any pair of vectors y and z of zeros and ones (i.e., two subsets of objects Y and Z). From z obtain x by iterating the following procedure. Take a coordinate of z that does not coincide with the corresponding coordinate of x; and replace it by the coordinate of x; obtaining z 0 : Proceed similarly from z 0 , until x is reached. Then, yR i z if y is obtained in at least one of the steps of these procedures starting at z to obtain x. Let S be the set of all separable preferences on f0; 1g K :
For simplicity we consider two agent SCFs. Following Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) an SCF f : S 2 ! f0; 1g K is voting by quota (not necessarily neutral) if there exists q 2 f1; 2g K such that for all (R 1 ; R 2 ) 2 S 2 and all k = 1; : : : ; K;
A characterization result in Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) implies that any strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF f : S 2 ! f0; 1g K is voting by quota. We indicate now how this setting relates to our result.
Let f : S 2 ! f0; 1g K be a voting by quota q: Let the binary relation be induced from f using (1) . The set of all separable preferences is rich on (f0; 1g K ; ) and is a subset of semilattice single-peaked preferences on (f0; 1g K ; ):
It turns out that the binary relation has an interesting equivalent representation (which we formally verify in Appendix A.3) that can be directly expressed using the quotas:
for all x; y 2 f0; 1g K ,
x y if and only if x 2 M B( ; y);
where M B( ; y) is as de…ned in Subsection 4.3.1 and the vector 2 f0; 1g K is as follows:
for every k = 1; : : : ; K, set
Moreover, it is easy to show that = sup f0; 1g K :
Finally, it is easy to see that the set of separable preferences is the intersection of all semilattice single-peaked preferences as the quotas vary across all possible values.
Final remarks
We …nish the paper with some …nal remarks related to issues left aside during the presentation of the main results.
Our approach and our axioms
An important feature of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is that it puts no a priori structure on the set of alternatives. The restricted domains literature typically proceeds by restricting the formulation to …nitely many alternatives with strict preferences or by restricting attention to SCF's that satisfy continuity and are de…ned over continuous preferences. We do not assume any structure of the set of alternatives. Our approach relies on assuming a common domain of preferences for the agents. As shown by Le Breton and Weymark (1999) (Proposition 1), under the assumption of a common domain of preferences, strategy-proof SCFs are such that each preference has a non-empty set of maximal elements on the range of the SCF and furthermore, the SCFs satisfy an appropriate version of unanimity. 22 We specialize to the case where there is a unique maximal element for each preference. This assumption excludes models where the set of alternatives has private components since an agent would be indi¤erent among alternatives when the private components of others change. 23 Our approach relies on the tops-only property which allows us to associate to each SCF the binary relation de…ned in (1) . The anonymity of the SCF is another key axiom that guarantees the antisymmetry of the binary relation while the richness assumption guarantees that it is a partial order. Speci…cally, our semilattice single-peakedness condition requires that the supremum of a pair not be ranked higher than the supremum of a particular pair, and thus admits indi¤erences since it is the negation of strict preferences. This condition is predicated upon a partial order with the supremum property; the antisymmetry of this partial order is indispensable to this condition. These features of our approach allow us to sidestep the usual restrictions like …niteness of the set of alternatives and the strictness and/or continuity of preferences that were alluded to above.
We next discuss in greater detail the role of the tops-only axiom on the social choice 22 These results do not assume any a priori structure on the set of alternatives. Their subsequent analysis assumes continuity of preferences. 23 See for instance Sprumont (1991) and Barberà, Berga and Moreno (2016) . Moulin (1984) and Berga (1998) indicate the di¢ culties of extending our results to a setting where agents' preferences may have several tops, even in models with pure public goods. Extending our analysis to these cases is interesting and left for future work.
function. We begin with the tops-only property. The usual justi…cation for this axiom is that it a¤ords very signi…cant descriptive and computational advantages. This property allows us to derive the binary relation on the set of alternatives from the social choice function and thus is crucial to our analysis. What can be said if one drops this axiom?
We present an example that suggests that it would be di¢ cult to derive interesting domain restrictions without the tops-only axiom. The example speci…es a preference domain that has no single-peaked type structure, but nonetheless admits a unanimous, anonymous and strategy-proof SCF. This SCF is however not tops-only.
Example 1 Let A = fx; y; z; wg be the set of alternatives and D the domain of …ve strict preferences: P One may wonder whether the fact that no structure is implied by the existence of a unanimous, anonymous, strategy-proof SCF (as seen in Example 1) is driven by the feature that the domain contains too "few" preferences. It might be possible to formulate a concept of richness for non-tops-only SCFs and make some progress on this issue, but the methodology would be very di¤erent and presumably much more complicated than the one considered in this paper.
Another way to drop the tops-only axiom and still derive restrictions on domains would be to strengthen the richness requirement so that the tops-only property follows as a consequence of strategy-proofness and unanimity. There indeed are results on restricted domains establishing that tops-onlyness is a requirement of strategy-proofness together with an additional property like unanimity, e¢ ciency or ontoness (see for instance Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991), Chatterji and Sen (2011), Sprumont (1995) , Weymark (2008) ).
But these approaches start from the very beginning with a given domain (often related to single-peakedness) and a set of alternatives whose structure is explicitly used in obtaining tops-onlyness as a requirement of strategy-proofness (and the additional property). We face two di¢ culties in following this approach. The …rst is that we do not impose any structure on the domain of the SCF, except that it has to be rich and each preference has a unique top, and no structure on the set of alternatives. It would be worthwhile to identify conditions on domains at the level of generality of our model where unanimity and strategy-proofness would ensure the tops-only property. These conditions can along with our richness requirement be used to replicate our analysis without the tops-only axiom.
This task is outside the scope of the present study. Secondly, this approach implies that every strategy-proof and unanimous SCF is tops-only. Our approach does not require the domain to be such that every strategy-proof and unanimous SCF is tops-only; we merely require that there is one with the tops-only property.
Example of a non-rich domain
Our methodology relies on establishing that a two agent strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF f : D 2 ! A induces a semilattice over A and that f takes the supremum form, i.e., for every x; y 2 A; sup (x; y) exists and f (x; y) = sup (x; y): We show here that the rich domain condition is indispensable for this property. It is well known that for domains with few preferences it is possible to de…ne strategy-proof SCFs. The smaller the domain is the larger the class of (often trivial) strategy-proof SCFs that might operate on it. The literature contains several alternative concepts of rich domains. However, all of them (as well as ours) are su¢ cient conditions which are far from being necessary. This applies also to our setting: it is possible to …nd a semilattice (A; ); a non-rich and semilattice single-peaked domain D on (A; ) and a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF de…ned on it.
The example below exhibits a domain D, a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF f : D 2 ! A whose induced partial order over A is not a semilattice because for some x; y 2 A; sup (x; y) does not exist (and hence f (x; y) 6 = sup (x; y)), and where D is not a rich domain on (A; ):
Example 2 Let A = fx; y; z; z; wg be the set of alternatives and D the domain of …ve strict preferences: Example 3 Let A = fw; ; x; v; yg be the set of alternatives. We consider the following domain D of exactly eight strict preferences given below: (2013) does not imply that our richness condition will necessarily be satis…ed. The converse is also true since our concept of richness can be applied to multidimensional models with multidimensional single-peaked (or separable) preferences which are excluded by strongly path connected domains. 25 Thus the two concepts of richness and consequently the results of the two papers are independent.
Savaglio and Vannucci (2014) consider a social choice setting where the set of alternatives is a distributive lattice (A; ) from which a latticial ternary betweenness relation is de…ned: z lies between x and y if and only if x^y z x _ y, where the binary 25 Chatterji, Sen and Zeng (2016) characterize single-peaked preferences on a tree (as de…ned by Demange (1983)) on strongly path connected domains using random social choice functions.
operations^and _ are the in…mum and the supremum taken according to , respectively.
Agents'preferences satisfy some unimodality conditions, that are consistent with this latticial ternary betweenness relation. They study and characterize strategy-proof SCFs on such domains. Note that our setting admits semilattices that are not necessarily lattices (the in…mum of pairs of alternatives may not exist) and more importantly, we do not start by assuming a speci…c structure on the set of alternatives but rather we obtain it as the consequence of the existence of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF on a rich domain of preferences.
Re¤gen (2015) considers the case where agents'preferences are single-peaked with respect to di¤erent linear orders and characterizes strategy-proof SCFs. These typically violate either anonymity or unanimity or both and hence, we cannot obtain his analysis as a special case of our approach as we did in Section 4 for other formulations of singlepeakedness.
5.4
Characterization of all strategy-proof SCFs and group strategy- takes the form g(P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ) = medft(P 1 ); t(P 2 ); t(P 3 ); 0; 1g; for all (P 1 ;
that is, a median voter rule with two …xed ballots located at the extremes. Trivially, g is tops-only, anonymous and unanimous. Moreover, using Moulin (1980) and Berga and Serizawa (2000) it can be easily veri…ed that in this case, the strategy-proofness of g requires that D be single-peaked on [0; 1]. 26 In particular, any weaker restriction of semilattice singlepeakedness (as in Figure 2 in Subsection 3.2) will never su¢ ce for the strategy-proofness of g.
The example above assumed a special structure on the set of alternatives and a very special form of the SCF. The domain implications for the general case of an arbitrary g : D n ! A where n is a positive odd integer is not attempted here. The purpose of the example is to indicate that the domain implication arising from the hypothesis that there exists an SCF with the required properties for an odd number of voters is likely to be considerably more restrictive than semilattice single-peakedness. Proposition 2 illustrates that semilattice single-peakedness su¢ ces for the design of a well-behaved SCF for all numbers of voters; the additional restrictions (for instance of single-peakedness as in the example above) implied by the hypothesis of the existence of a well-behaved SCF for an odd number of voters are in a sense spurious. We devote the remainder of this section to identifying a class of SCF's which are de…ned on an odd number of voters and where the restriction on the domain implied by the axioms is exactly semilattice single-peakedness.
We will do so by introducing an additional axiom. 27 This axiom requires that the SCF satisfy an invariance requirement across two pro…les of preferences where agents tops are either of two alternatives x or y; when the number of agents with top x and top y di¤er by exactly one across the two pro…les. 
Remark 2 Let g : D n ! A, where n 3 is positive odd integer, be a tops-only SCF and o be the binary relation induced by g over A: If g is anonymous, and satis…es invariance, then o is antisymmetric. If g is unanimous, then o is re ‡exive.
Remark 3 The analogues of Lemmata 1 and 2 can be proved analogously for o as well by standard arguments. We omit the details.
Finally we obtain as Proposition 4 the extension of Proposition 3 to the case where n 3 is a positive odd integer and the SCF satis…es in addition invariance. Consider the Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) setting with n = 3 and K = 2:
The SCF f : S 3 ! f0; 1g 2 de…ned by quota q = (q 1 ; q 2 ) satis…es invariance if and only if q 1 6 = 2 and q 2 6 = 2.
Clearly, in the Moulin (1980) and in the Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) settings there are many instances of well studied SCFs that satisfy all our requirements but violate invariance. But in both cases, there indeed exist some SCFs which satisfy invariance in addition to the properties we have imposed in this paper. 28 In what follows, we provide a brief account of the picture without assuming invariance.
A.1.1. Odd number of agents without invariance
We continue the analysis of an odd number of agents by not imposing invariance of the SCF. At the end of this subsection we introduce invariance in order to understand its role in Proposition 4.
We restrict attention to the case n = 3: By the cloning method employed in Fact 1, we can induce such an SCF whenever one exists for an odd number of agents that is divisible by 3. Let f : D 3 ! A be strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF. Fix x 2 A and de…ne, following a procedure also introduced by Bogomolnaia (1998) , g x : D 2 ! A by setting, for each pair y; z 2 A; g x (y; z) = f (x; y; z): Then g x is a strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous SCF. Note that we cannot deduce that g x is unanimous since g x (y; y) = y does not follow from the assumed unanimity of f: Let x be the binary relation induced by g x over A using (1) . Remark 1 applies and the binary relation x is antisymmetric but cannot be assumed re ‡exive since g x (y; y) = y is not guaranteed.
We will therefore consider binary relations that are antisymmetric and transitive (which will follow from the richness axiom we introduce below) and refer to them as orders. The following de…nitions generalize our concepts of richness and semilattice single-peakedness to the case at hand. (in the sense of De…nition 4). We omit the details. Consequently, analogously to Proposition 3, we obtain here for all x; y; z 2 A, g x (y; z) = sup x (y; z) and D is order-family single-peaked on (A; f r g r2A ).
To summarize, if a domain D admits a three agent SCF satisfying strategy-proofness, tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity and the richness condition is satis…ed, then D is order-family single-peaked on (A; f r g r2A ). However, we have been unable to evaluate whether this concept of single-peakedness would su¢ ce for the design of a strategy-proof SCF satisfying tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity. This is the principal di¢ culty in extending our analysis for an even number of agents in Section 2 to the case of an odd number of agents.
We are however able to design an SCF with the required four properties if we introduce additionally a concept of invariance of the family of orders. We express invariance in terms of the family of orders as follows. We say that the family of orders f r g r2A satis…es orderinvariance if sup x (x; y) = sup y (x; y) for all pairs (x; y): This condition would be implied by the existence of an SCF de…ned for an odd number of agents that satis…es strategyproofness, tops-onlyness, anonymity, unanimity and invariance in the sense of De…nition 3.
We may now de…ne a two agent SCF in the following manner; for any pair (x; x) of alternatives, de…ne f (x; x) = x; while for any pair (x; y); x 6 = y; of alternatives, de…ne f (x; y) = sup x (x; y) = sup y (x; y): It is evident that this SCF satis…es anonymity, unanimity and is tops-only. This SCF will also satisfy strategy-proofness whenever D is order-family singlepeaked on (A; f r g r2A ). Indeed we have f (x; y) = sup y (x; y)R x, it is evident that sup (x; y) 2 M B(x; ). Next, to show that sup (x; y) 2 M B(x; sup (z; y)), we simplify the notation and let sup (x; y) = w and sup (z; y) = w 0 . We know that for each k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg, w k = med > (x k ; y k ; k ) and w 0 k = med > (z k ; y k ; k ). Assume without loss of generality that x k y k . Consider three situations: (i) w k = x k , (ii) w k = k and (iii) w k = y k . In situation (i), it is evident that either To prove the other implication in the de…nition of x y by (1) assume f (x; y) = x:
We want to show that x y: Take an arbitrary k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg. Suppose …rst that x k = 0: 
A.4. Finite set of alternatives
We identify in the Corollary below a set of necessary conditions on any strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous SCF which applies to the case where the set of alternatives is …nite and n is an even positive integer. This is obtained by combining Proposition 3 with a result on two agent SCFs from Bogomolnaia (1998). 
